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As human populations and their demands on 
natural resources continue to grow, citizens and 
officials from around the world search ever more 
intensely for effective solutions to environmental 
problems. Various factors conspire to make natural 
resources difficult to govern well. First, since 
many larger scale natural resources can 
be common pool resources, they pose differ-
ent—and arguably more difficult—challenges 
to governance than private or public goods. 
Second, the use of natural resources can produce 
significant externalities. Third, the complex spatial 
and temporal nature of natural resources along with 
their potential externalities rarely conform to 
existing political institutions. Environmental 
problems often take decades or even centuries to 
emerge; their solutions may take equally long. 
Ideas about how to govern natural resources have 
evolved significantly over the last 30 years. Many 
perceive centralized, top down approaches as 
having failed and advocate for more decentralized 
policies. Two major forms have emerged. The first 
seeks to devolve property 
rights over natural re-
sources to local individu-
als and communities. The 
second advocates the 
decentralization of the 
formal powers of 
government to its own 
subunits. Both kinds of 
decentralization make 
claims that outcomes will 
be more efficient, flexible, 
equitable, accountable, 
and participatory. 
While popular, there 
are few systematic, comparative studies of these 
experiments in environmental policy. Scholars 
and policymakers do not have adequate answers 
to even the most basic of questions, such as what 
determines successful decentralization policy? Why 
would some local politicians exploit while others 
ignore the opportunities that decentralization 
provides? In this essay, we draw on our earlier 
work in comparative politics to improve our 
understanding of this increasingly common form of 
authority migration (Andersson 2003; Gibson and 
Lehoucq 2003; Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 
2004). We review the existing arguments and 
present some of our empirical work on 
decentralized forestry policy in Bolivia and 
Guatemala. We find that 
decentralized policies create different patterns of 
incentives for local politicians, patterns that help 
determine their efforts—and degrees of success—in 
the sector. 
Recent Changes in Natural 
Resource Governance 
The poor performance of central governments 
in the protection of natural resources has led to 
new ideas about their governance over the past 
few decades. Among other ideas (like new ways 
to privatize negative externalities like pollution), 
one major approach advocates the decentraliza-
tion of the formal powers of government to its 
own subunits.1 Decentralization’s proponents 
argue that making local governments respon-
sible for the provision of a wide variety of goods 
and services should result in more efficient, 
flexible, equitable, accountable, and participa-
tory government (e.g., Oates 1972; World Bank 
1988; Rondinelli, McCullough, and Johnson 
1989; Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Crook and 
Manor 1998). Local politicians and officials 
should design more appropriate policies since 
they have more information about their envi-
ronment and local residents’ needs. According 
to the World Resources Institute, at least 60 
countries are decentralizing some aspects of the 
governance of natural resources (Ribot 2003).2 
Debates exist within this intragovernmental 
decentralization approach about the factors 
necessary for successful decentralized natural 
resource policy. Two theories are most 
prominent. First, many analysts contend that 
decentralization efforts fail because central 
governments do not provide sufficient financial 
and administrative resources (Adamolekun 
1991; Smoke 1993; Prud’homme 1994; Parry 
1997; De Mello 1999; Crook and Manor 1998; 
Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Blair 2000; Bird and 
Vaillancourt 1999; Bahl and Linn 1994; Bahl 
1999; Kaimowitz et al. 1998; 1999; 2000).3 
Even if some political power were decentralized 
to some degree, central governments may 
prevent the actual decentralization to take 
place by giving local governments an unfunded 
mandate (e.g., Gibson 1999; Ferroukhi 2003). 
For example, in 1997, Nicaragua’s central 
government decided to pass off some of their 
environmental duties to municipal governments, 
but because of inadequate financial support, 
most local governments were unable to perform 
their new duties (Larsson 2003). 
Second, in addition to the lack of resources 
argument, scholars insist that effective 
decentralization requires accountability. Several 
recent studies assert that no decentralized 
strategy will work without institutions to tie 
local politician’s actions to the preferences of 
their constituents (Manor 1999; Crook and 
Manor 1998; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Blair 
2000; Rolla 1998). Local-level elections are the 
form of accountability most scholars explore; 
they find that regular, fair, and competitive 
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elections induce politicians to create policies that can turn 
decentralized powers into efficient and equitable outcomes (Crook 
and Manor 1998; Echeverri-Gent 1992; Fiszbein 1997; Blair 
2000). This body of work (unlike the public finance literature in 
which local politicians are assumed to be benign implementers) 
assumes that local politicians and officials have in mind their own 
goals which might impede or distort decentralized policy. 
Both the lack of resources and accountability approaches  
are useful in moving us away from an uncritical acceptance of 
decentralized policy as the panacea to all environmental ills. But 
even these studies are hampered by certain methodological and 
substantive issues. First, analyses are generally composed of in- 
depth, qualitative case studies. While irreplaceable with regard to 
their detailed information (for instance, see the excellent overview 
of decentralization laws in Latin America by Larson 2003),4 such 
work cannot make confident generalizations given their small 
sample sizes and research designs. Second, authors treat elections 
as the only influence on local politicians’ actions. In this study we 
develop a more appropriate research design to test our hypotheses 
and a more nuanced view of the politics of decentralized 
environmental policies. 
Modeling Local Politicians’ Interest 
We suggest that analysts studying decentralized natural 
resource policy focus on the perspectives of local-level 
politicians. As opposed to many decentralization studies that 
assume beneficent local governments interested in maximizing 
social welfare (and falling short only because of a lack of 
technical competence or appropriate financial resources), we view 
local politicians as individuals who worry about staying in power. 
Staying in power, in turn, means that local politicians must make 
choices about how to employ their limited time and resources to 
serve political as well as policy goals. Given this view, the shift 
to decentralized natural resource management may or may not 
change local politicians’ preferences in a way that protects forests 
and other resources. Local politicians will care only as long as the 
new policy fits their political preferences, which may overwhelm 
the dictates of economic or environmental efficiency. Given that 
local politicians are the individuals charged with carrying out 
decentralized policies, explaining the success or failure of such 
policies requires the exploration of the incentives and constraints 
that local politicians face. 
In the study we present here regarding the decentralization of 
forestry policy, we argue that local politicians will invest their 
time and resources into forestry activities if they reap political 
or financial rewards from doing so. Only with such incentives 
can any decentralized policy hope to be effective. For example, 
investing in a municipal forestry program may enhance or 
constrain their official powers, their municipality’s revenues, or 
their electoral chances. More specifically, we argue that these 
benefits will vary with three conditions: 
1) The degree of fiscal and/or regulatory gains granted to local 
governments (May et al. 2002; Oakerson 1999; Hadenius 
2003). We hypothesize that local politicians are more likely to 
express interest in forests if the decentralization policy grants 
them more fiscal and regulatory powers. Local politicians are 
ever searching for an increase in revenues, which is more likely 
under circumstances in which they have greater fiscal authority 
(Kaimowitz et al. 2001). Regulatory powers would increase their 
ability to reward followers. In either case, fiscal and regulatory 
benefits would give local authorities incentives to participate 
actively in a decentralized policy. 
2) The strength of demands from organized interest groups 
(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Birk 2000; Muñoz and Elsner 
2000). Whether accountable to an electorate or not, we reason 
that organized interest groups at the local level can influence a 
politician’s interest and actions. Such interest groups may be 
local, as in a farmers’ cooperative, or generated by outsiders, as 
in an international conservation group. Agricultural interest 
groups may undermine forestry policy if they seek to extend their 
 
 
 
lands; conservationists may influence politicians to invest in the 
protection of forests. 
3) Central government support and supervision (Andersson 2002; 
Altman and Lalander 2003; Behrendt 2002; Pacheco 2000). If 
there are no gains from the decentralized policy, and the central 
government does not monitor local politicians’ compliance, it 
is less likely that a politician will invest much time or energy 
into the policy. Even if a policy carries no benefits for a local 
politician, central governments can assert influence by imposing 
costs for noncompliance. 
There are also several structural variables that might influence 
the motivation of local politicians. The availability and value 
of forest resources may increase political interest in forest 
conservation (Andersson 2003). If a local politician’s district 
has extensive forests with significant timbering opportunities, 
for example, then that politician might respond positively to any 
new powers bequeathed by a central government. Market access 
(Hecht 2001) may also increase the value of forest resources 
and encourage local governments to protect (or cut) these 
natural resources. Some scholars also argue that the presence 
of indigenous populations—groups that possess long-term 
knowledge and even dependence on forests—will result in better 
protection of environmental resources (Becker and León 2000; 
Birk 2000; Elias 2000). 
A Study of Bolivia and Guatemala 
We test our hypotheses about the factors that lead local 
politicians to invest in decentralized forestry policy with data 
from Bolivia and Guatemala. In 1996, Bolivian and Guatemalan 
policymakers both enacted new forestry laws that devolved 
significant authority and financial incentives to municipalities to 
administer public forests within their jurisdictions. Under the new 
policies, both countries’ municipal governments are responsible 
for providing technical advice to local forest users, assisting the 
central government’s forestry authority to enforce the national 
forestry laws, and helping local forest users obtain formal 
property rights over forest resources. 
The differences between the two countries’ decentralized 
forestry policy are apparent in three main areas (see Table 1). 
First, Bolivian municipalities cannot collect any taxes on forestry 
activities, charge user fees for the forestry services produced, 
or impose fines on individuals who are caught disobeying the 
government laws and regulations. In contrast, Guatemalan 
municipalities enjoy those rights (Ferroukhi and Echeverría 
2003). Second, municipal governments in Guatemala, but not in 
Bolivia, have the authority to own the forests on their municipal 
land, which they can manage according to their management 
rules. Finally, the local governments in Guatemala, but not in 
Bolivia, may cede the responsibility for resource governance to 
the community via local agreements. 
We employ a variety of data and tests to explore our argument 
about the causes for local politicians’ interest and actions in the 
context of decentralized natural resource policy. To obtain data 
about mayoral incentives and actions, we surveyed randomly 
selected samples of 100 municipal governments in both Bolivia 
and Guatemala.5 In each selected municipality, we interviewed the 
elected mayor who held office during the 1996–2000 term; each 
face-to-face interview took approximately 2 hours. The survey 
instrument (258 questions) is designed to elicit information 
regarding each mayor’s policy priorities, staff, relationship 
with central and non-governmental agencies, and relationship 
with citizens. Checking the mayors’ responses with archival 
data, we believe the survey is highly reliable. The surveys were 
completed between 2000 and 2002. A difference of means test 
using a variety of community characteristics, including population 
density, rural population, per capita income, forested area, and 
literacy, demonstrates that each sample is representative of each 
country’s population of municipal governments. We also collected 
socioeconomic information derived from census data for each 
municipality. 
We begin with some simple descriptive statistics that show the 
low relative importance that mayors in Bolivia and Guatemala 
give to the forestry sector. We asked mayors to consider the 
importance of different sectors relative to others according 
to an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (much less important than 
other sectors) to 5 (much more important than other sectors). 
Their responses reveal that mayors in both countries are less 
interested in forestry than in other important municipal services, 
with forestry ranking as one of the least important sectors in 
both Bolivia and Guatemala. The median ordinal score given to 
forestry by the mayors in the two countries corresponds to “less 
important than other sectors.” While forestry ranks relatively 
low in both countries, Guatemalan mayors rank forestry higher 
than their Bolivian counterparts (mean of 3.3 to 2.7) and this 
difference is statistically significant (p<.05). Guatemalan mayors 
also give a significantly larger proportion of their municipal 
budgets to forestry activities than their Bolivian counterparts. 
These descriptive statistics indicate that forests are not a priority 
for the majority of mayors in either country as measured by 
their rankings of sectoral priorities and staff and budgetary 
allocations. But they also indicate that there is variance within and 
between the countries. To unpack these variations, we proceed to 
multivariate tests. 
We use two measures to capture the mayors’ actions in the 
forestry sector. These include the proportion of the municipal 
budget allocated to forestry activities and the proportion of 
 
 
 
municipal staff assigned to forestry. Both measures are three- 
category ordinal variables, for which a value of 1 means “low,” 
2 means “medium,” and 3 means “high.” Our independent variables 
are intended to operationalize our hypotheses about what drives a 
mayor’s actions: demands from local community- 
based organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
mayors’ perceptions of central government supervisory efforts 
in forestry, and mayors’ perceptions of the importance of timber 
income to their municipal budget. 6 We control for the personal 
characteristics of the mayor (education, political orientation, and 
political party affiliation) and structural variables regarding the 
municipality (percent forest cover, per capita municipal income, 
population density, proportion of indigenous population, level of 
infrastructure development). We also include a dummy variable for 
country to measure the policy differences between the two 
governments’ decentralizations. Since the dependent variables are 
ordinal, we use logistic regression in our estimations. 
Table 2 presents the results of the two regression models. For 
both models, mayoral incentives (i.e., the political economy 
variables) perform consistently better than both structural and 
personal characteristic variables in explaining variation in mayoral 
decision making in the forestry sectors of Bolivia and Guatemala. 
Demands from local organizations have a positive effect, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level on both measures of the 
local executive’s actions in forestry. Timber income is 
significantly related to increases in the share of the 
municipality’s budget (at p<.05). Central government supervision 
is also highly significant for both the municipality’s budget and its 
own level of forestry staff. The share of the municipality’s population 
that is considered indigenous by census enumerators is significant at 
different levels in each equation (p<.10, p<.05), as is  
the mayor’s education level (p<.05, p<.01). 
We transform Table 2’s results into conditional probabilities 
in Table 3 (setting all other independent variables at their mean 
values). For the budget model, the significant variables with 
the largest predicted change are the political economy 
variables. Moving from minimums to maximums, local 
demands increase the probability of the municipality being 
in the “high” category of budgetary allocations to forestry by 
nearly 57%; timber income increases the same probability by 
39% and staffing from the central government by 34%. A 
move from a minimum to maximum of mayoral education 
also increases forestry’s budget share by nearly 27%, and 
indigenous populations increase it by 18%. 
Political economic variables also account for the strongest 
effects on the mayor’s decision to assign municipal staff to 
forestry activities. Again moving from minimum to maximum 
for significant variables, local demands increase the probability 
of a mayor’s forestry staff being in the high category by 51%; 
central supervision increases the probability by almost 37%. 
The mayor’s education also results in a strong positive 
increase, nearly 39%. Interestingly, a shift from minimum to 
maximum 
for indigenous population decreases the probability that 
the municipality has a high number of staff allocated to 
forestry by 25%, as opposed to the increase in budget of 
the last model. 
We find some support for our hypothesis that 
decentralizing powers to the municipal level encourages 
mayors to act differently in Guatemala than in Bolivia. 
According to our results, Guatemalan mayors are almost 20 
percentage points more likely to invest a high proportion of 
their budget in forestry than their Bolivian counterparts. 
These results provide support for the theoretical  
expectation that a mayor who can gain politically from 
increased control over the forest will devote more resources to 
it. Guatemalan mayors use their control over local forests to 
either increase municipal revenues or please their constituents 
in order to get re-elected; the forestry sector may provide 
opportunities less evident in Bolivia. Bolivian mayors have much 
less room for political maneuvering in this sector than their 
Guatemalan counterparts who are entitled to devolve governance 
responsibilities to local communities, issue permits for harvesting 
timber, rent out their municipal forests, and sell technical services 
to local forest users. 
This interpretation raises the question as to why the difference 
between the countries does not show up in the proportion 
of municipal staff that is assigned to forestry. One plausible 
explanation is that staff allocation is a more complex indicator of 
mayoral motivation. The complexity is related to what seems to 
be a threshold effect that influences the mayors’ staff allocation 
decisions. While all municipal governments—regardless of 
income levels, size, and availability of forest resources—are 
able to assign some proportion of their budget to forestry, not all 
municipalities can afford to hire a forester. Though Guatemalan 
mayors have a more extensive mandate in the forestry sector than 
their Bolivian counterparts, this advantage is likely offset by their 
generally smaller budgets, which limits their staff. 
Conclusion 
Forests, like many natural resources, exhibit characteristics 
that defy simple policy solutions. Forests can be common pool 
resources, making the exclusion of potential users difficult. 
Forests have important externalities with regard to atmospheric, 
hydrological, and biological services. Forests (and their 
associated subsystems) take far longer to develop than the sitting 
 
 
 
terms of parliamentarians or presidents. And forests are complex: 
they can generate multiple products—wood for construction 
and/or fuel, wildlife, water, leaves, fruits, fodder, seeds, straw, 
shade, fertile soil, stones, etc. These products may be either 
consumptive or non-consumptive, mature at different rates, 
and have the characteristics of common pool, private, or public 
goods providing ecosystem services for regions, countries, and 
continents. 
Decentralized natural resource policies emerged as an 
alternative to central government control due, in part, to these 
difficulties in finding simple policy solutions. But decentralized 
natural resource policy depends on more than the hopes of the 
central government or international organizations, more than 
the time- and place-specific knowledge of local politicians. 
We have argued that the political incentives of local politicians 
will determine their interest and actions in the forestry sector. 
Decentralized policies that bestow advantages to incumbent 
politicians (or significant costs on those who fail to act) are far 
more likely to be pursued. The Bolivia-Guatemala comparison 
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1. Another major approach advocates decentralizing 
management of natural resources to the community level 
(Ostrom 1990; Arnold 1990; Ascher 1995; for reviews see 
Baland and Platteau 1996; Agrawal and Gibson 1999). 
2. As with any general concept, there are as nearly as 
many definitions of decentralization as there are studies 
themselves. But for most researchers, and for the purposes of 
this proposal, we define decentralization as any act in which 
a central government formally cedes power to actors and 
institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and 
territorial hierarchy (Mahwood 1983; Smith 1985; Smoke 1993; 
Rondinelli 1990; Agrawal and Ribot 1999). 
3. Some critics even warn that central governments can use the guise of 
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